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Abstract 
Australia is replete with commissions and inquiries into egregious behaviour in its financial 
sector. This author has quantified the effects of those behaviours on individuals and the wider 
economy.1 These investigations include Heydon2 (elimination of unhealthy culture), Hayne3 
(confluence of law and morality) and the Productivity Commission4 (trust). The most important 
Hayne recommendations5 ― which would reduce Australia’s international reputation as a 
regulatory outlier and better reflect community expectations remain unresolved. Confused 
parliamentary leadership has facilitated corruption of the financial regulatory system which has 
for many people been an abject disaster.6 The Australian government must act. It must do so 
strategically. It must establish the nexus between the intent of the law and its practical 
implementation for those it purports to serve. Parliament has yet to debate the underlying causes 
focussing instead on tactical and punitive responses. If it does, then it must confront the distinction 
between prescriptive statute and principles-based supervision, recognising the power of 
antecedent fiduciary law. These are philosophical as well as legal questions. Hayne pointed to the 
need for a framework for the re-integration of the intent and spirit of the law with its statutory 
manifestations, presently scattered and inconsistent. This paper is that framework. Without it, 
much of the financial services and products sectors may continue its descent into the Stygian 
gloom of costly and inconsistent multi-layered bespoke regulation. An unintended consequence 
of paternalist policy will be fewer market participants, less choice and fewer opportunities to 






1 David G Millhouse, ‘Empirical Analysis supports the Hayne long run reform thesis’ (2019) 13(2–3) Law and 
Financial Markets Review 81,162. 
2 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade Union Governance and Corruption (Final Report, December 
2015) ch 4, 10 (Commissioner Heydon) (‘Heydon’). See also Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Trade 
Union Governance and Corruption (Interim Report,  December 2014) 904 (Commissioner Heydon); 
3 Commonwealth, Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry (2018) (Commissioner Hayne) (‘Hayne’). 
4 Australian Government Productivity Commission, Competition in the Australian Financial System (Draft 
Report, January 2018); Australian Government Productivity Commission, Superannuation: Assessing Efficiency 
and Competitiveness (Report No 91, 2018) (‘Productivity Commission 2018’). 
5 Hayne (n 3), recs 73 and 74, vol 1, 494-6. 
6 David G Millhouse, ‘Systemic and Cyclical Failure in Australian Financial Services and Financial Products 
Sectors: Have weaknesses in law contributed to these failures?’ (PhD Thesis, Bond University, 2019) ch 1 s 6. 
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Australia has a history of law reform designed to promote economic development circumvented and 
corrupted by malfeasors using legal complexities and omissions to further their own interests. The 
accretive culture, fragmentation and complexity of Australian law leads to uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
enforcement deadweight costs for investor and regulators. If Australia wishes to pursue an agenda of 
becoming a world financial centre, then law reform is an essential pre-condition.  
Australia is a global outlier in many important aspects of its financial regulation. Specifically, it is almost 
unique in the use of trusts as large commercial trading enterprises, low licencing and capitalisation 
barriers to entry, limited fit and proper competency requirements, non-adherence to many International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
(MiFID) 1 & 11 provisions, regulation of custody, and its poacher-gamekeeper model for Managed 
Investment Schemes (MIS). 
Its corporate governance regime has often failed those it purports to protect ― the investing public. 
Failure is not rare. Remediation is costly, with significant time elapsed to achieve limited financial 
outcomes. Subsequent regulatory response has been directly related to the degree of public pressure from 
those aggrieved seeking remedies as a result of a crisis, or a report driven by economic policy objectives. 
Many of the responses have been lacking insight and are mostly tactical.7 
 
Judicial opinion has been scathing about the deficiencies and uncertainties in the law regulating 
Australian financial products and financial services.8 Other legal opinion is equally severe: ‘overly 
prescriptive, complex and poorly drafted [Product Disclosure Statements ‘PDS’]: The regime relies upon 
definitions within definitions and exceptions within exceptions. It is difficult for lawyers to get their 
heads around ― let alone investors lacking in legal training’.9  
Accretive statutory reforms alone, whilst superficially attractive given their relative ease of 
implementation, have not resolved systemic deficiencies in regulation. In Australia creative compliance 
occurs where statutory provisions are interpreted narrowly and abuse escaped close scrutiny.  
 
7 Chief Justice Paul de Jersey, 'Developments in Financial Services Law of the last 30 years' (Speech 
delivered at the Banking and Finance Services Law Association 30th Annual Conference, Gold Coast 
Qld, Australia, 30 August 2013). 
8 See, eg, Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42 [122] (Kirby J); 
Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 Summary 3 
(Rares J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Australian Property Custodian 
Holdings Limited (Receivers and Managers appointed) (in liquidation)(Controllers appointed)(No 3) 
[2013] FCA 1342 (12 December 2013) [463] (Murphy J); Re Environvest Ltd (No 4) [2010] VSC 549 
[2]–[3] (Judd J); Aequitas v AEFC [2001] NSWSC 14 [363] (Austin J); Australian Softwood Forests 
Pty Ltd v Attorney-General (NSW) Ex Rel Corporate Affairs Commission [1981] HCA 49 [37] 
(Murphy J); Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Bridgecorp Finance Ltd [2006] 
NSWSC 836 [17] (Barrett J) citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Mauer-Swiss 
Securities Ltd [2002] NSWSC 684 (Palmer J); Trilogy Funds Management Limited v Sullivan (No 2) 
[2015] FCA 1452 [1] (Wigney J); ASIC v Vines [2006] NSWSC 738 [14] (Austin J). 
9 Garry T Bigmore and Simon Rubenstein, ‘Rights of Investors in Failed or Insolvent Managed 
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One court likened Australia’s financial services and financial products industries to Dante’s Inferno. It 
chose vivid adjectives ‘byzantine’ and ‘purgatorial’.10 This speaks loudly of the need for rational reform 
in the provision of financial products and financial services.  
The reform goal must be clearly directed at restoring public trust, confidence, and respect. 
Fundamentally, this requires recognition of fiduciary obligations to investors and beneficiaries often 
wrongly assumed by them to exist. Holistic fiduciary standards in the investment chain is a different 
proposition from compliance with regulation. It leads to a different result. 
Heydon11 identified problematic deficiencies in regulation aided by an ‘unhealthy culture’. He sought to 
excise unhealthy culture ― ‘if unchecked, the culture comes to taint and impact the wider society’.12 
‘History appears to be repeating itself …13 It is a recurring problem…. it is insidious. It is immensely 
damaging … longstanding … clandestine …’,14 insightfully citing fiduciary duty as the antidote. 
As Hayne noted: 
[G]iven the existing breadth and complexity of the regulation of the financial services industry, adding 
any new layer of law or regulation will add a new layer of compliance cost and complexity. […] [T]here 
is every chance that adding a new layer of law and regulation would only serve to distract attention from 
the very simple ideas that must inform the conduct of financial services entities.15 [...] These ideas are very 
simple. Their simplicity points firmly towards a need to simplify the existing law [...] in the blizzard of 
[statutory] provisions, it is too easy to lose sight of those simple ideas that must inform the conduct of 
financial services entities.16 
 
Hayne distinguishes between ‘ticking boxes’ and ‘[w]hat is the right thing to do?’17 The ‘right thing’ 
meets community expectations of fiduciary obligation in the investment chain. His most important 
recommendations,18 being elimination of conflicts of interest and duty, establishment of behavioural 
norms through the conjunction of law and morality, and simplification of the law. This ‘velvet hammer’, 
being ‘NewLaw, not more OldLaw’19 will require significant parliamentary debate. His most important 
observation ― ‘the task of simplification grows harder and will take much longer … because the law is 
 
10 Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 [118] 
(Rares J) (‘Wingecarribee’). 
11 Heydon (n 2). 
12 Ibid ch 4, 10. 
13 Ibid ch 4, 29–30 citing 1982 Winneke Royal Commission, 1992 Gyles Royal Commission, 2003 
Cole Royal Commission. 
14 Ibid ch 4, [58]. 
15 Hayne's ‘simple ideas’ are to: ‘[o]bey the law. Do not mislead or deceive. Be fair. Provide services 
that are fit for purpose. Deliver services with reasonable care and skill. When acting for another, act in 
the best interests of that other.’ 
16 Hayne (n 3) vol 1 290. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Hayne (n 3) recs 7.3, 7.4 vol 1 494-496. 
19 Stuart Fuller, ‘Hayne’s velvet hammer nails the need for change’ The Australian Financial Review, 
Sydney 15th February 2019. 
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now spread over so many different Acts and is as complex as it is … the very size of the task shows why 
it must be tackled.’20 
 
This ‘larger task’ is supported by the ALRC,21 noting that ‘the common law and equity often achieved 
fundamental regulatory goals in a simpler way than statutes’.22 This is entirely consistent with this 
authors’ empirical analysis. If its predictive veracity is correct, 23 then the egregious behaviour uncovered 
by Heydon and Hayne and the Productivity Commission should give great cause for concern. The ALRC, 
noting that ‘A good reform topic will have a broader policy context’24 proposes a 36-month inquiry, yet 
to be funded by the Commonwealth. Despite agreeing to implement these important Hayne 
recommendations,25 there is no legislative action. 
 
Hayne ‘marks the start and not the end of a process of change’,26 the basis for re-establishment of trust. 
Statutory reform, to eliminate present legal structure[s] within which financial services takes place,’27 
needs to follow. ‘Without it, we privilege the illusion of reform, elevate the symbolic over the 
substantive, and contribute to a self-defeating deterioration in already low levels of public trust’.28 That 
‘illusion of reform’ continues in superannuation.29 Political complicity, feeding upon naivety, and driven 
by interest groups30 masquerading as professional associations have already blunted some of the Hayne 
recommendations. 
 
The Productivity Commission recognises the practical limits of disclosure regulation, limited financial 
literacy competencies, recognising that behavioural economics provides important insights into policy 
formulation.31 These practical limitations are exacerbated by conflicts of interest, particularly in 
vertically integrated businesses, proposing a ‘legal duty of care’.32 That proposed duty includes design 
 
20 Hayne (n 3) vol 1 495. 
21 Australian Law Reform Commission, The Future of Law Reform: A Suggested Program of Work 
2020-25 (Report, December 2019), 31-36 (‘ALRC 2019’). 
22 Ibid 34, citing Hon Chief Justice JLB Allsop AO, ‘The Judicialisation of Values’ (Speech, Law 
Council of Australia and Federal Court of Australia Joint Competition Law Conference, 30 August 
2018 [11]– [15]. 
23 Millhouse, (n 1) 176. 
24 ALRC 2019 (n 21), 15. 
25 Australian Government, Restoring trust in Australia’s financial system ― The Government response 
to the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry (February 2019) 38 (‘Restoring Trust 2019’). 
26 Justin O’Brien, Private correspondence 1. See also, Justin O’Brien (2019) ‘”Because they could”: 
Trust, Integrity, and Purpose in the Regulation of Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Royal 
Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services Industry; Justin 
O’Brien (2019) ‘Trust, Accountability and Purpose ― The Regulation of Corporate Governance, 
Corporate Governance  (Cambridge Elements, ed Thomas Clarke UTS Business School, Sydney).  
27 Justin O’Brien, Private correspondence 2.  
28 Justin O’Brien, Private correspondence 3.  
29 See generally, Pamela F Hanrahan, Legal Framework Governing Aspects of the Australian 
Superannuation System Background Paper 25 Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry [‘Hayne’]. 
30 Hayne (n 3) vol 1 495 citing Treasury, Interim Report Submission, 5 [23]–[25]. 
31 Productivity Commission 2019 (n 4), ch 2, 85; pt 111, 352–356. 
32 Ibid ch 8, 227. 
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of a 21st century disclosure regime33 where ‘consumers resort to making decisions based on trust’.34 For 
the Productivity Commission to achieve this policy objective, fiduciary obligation to quality assure the 
investment chain is an essential and inviolable precondition. 
 
It is unfortunate that their analysis of best interest obligations of financial advisers under the FoFA regime 
is incomplete.35 An uninformed reader might assume this is a statement of the law, which would be 
incorrect. Similarly, whilst a useful analysis of investor typology, there are no clear proposals for 
reform.36 It is equally unfortunate to propose extending ASIC’s mandate without an agreed plan to reform 
it. For ASIC to adopt a supervisory proactive posture will require its substantive reform. The Commission 
merely proposes further examination.37 Community expectation that ASIC can police every commercial 
transaction is unaffordable, undesirable and unachievable. Itts mandate is being extended,38 but it is ‘not 
feasible to contract [ex ante] for every contingency’.39  
There has been considerable discussion and government policy directed at Australia becoming at least a 
regional financial centre,40 originally dating to Campbell in 1981 and Wallis in 1997. For that, Australia 













33 Ibid pt 111, 347, 366. 
34 Ibid pt 111, 355. 
35 Ibid app D3, 557. 
36 Ibid 560. 
37 Ibid ch 7, 473. 
38 Ibid pt 17. 
39 Sven Hoeppner and Christian Kirchner, ‘Ex Ante versus Ex post Governance: A behavioural 
perspective’ (2016) 12(2) Review of Law and Economics 227, 232. 
40 See, eg, Mark Johnson, Australia as a Regional Financial Centre (Financial Centre Forum Report, 
January 2010) ('Johnson'); Mark Johnson, Australia as a Financial Centre Seven Years on (Financial 
Services Council Report, June 2016). 
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2. More Statute, More Confusion 
As Australian judicial frustration and scholarly opinion illustrates, present policy has led to the Age of 
Statutes:41 a large increase in the volume and number of statutes, with often conflicting and confusing 
definitions of important basic terms. Reliance on statutory pre- and proscriptions has resulted in legislation 
that is labyrinthine: 
The definitions that mark out the regulatory perimeter are lengthy [and] often complex, and spread throughout 
the legislation. Within that perimeter, the rules themselves are highly specific and detailed: these are often 
made in response to relentless industry pressure on governments and regulators to supply black-letter 
prescriptive rules and guidelines that allow compliance risk to be managed internally by firms using a check-
box approach … the legislation has been described as ‘obscure and convoluted’.42 
Wallis’s market-based principles rely on disclosure and informed consent based on financial literacy. 
‘Labyrinthine’ legislation has corrupted that intent. For example:  
Repeated attempts by government and regulators over the last 15 years to legislate for meaningful financial 
product disclosure have produced a patchwork of content requirements for PDS’S, spread across many 
hundreds of pages in the [Corporations Act], the Corporations Regulations and the Schedules to the 
Regulations, ASIC instruments and ASIC Regulatory Guides.43 
In Wingecarribee: 
Those Acts that now deal with misleading and deceptive conduct, apply differently depending on distinctions 
such as whether the alleged misleading conduct is in relation to a ‘financial product or a financial service’,44 
or ‘financial services’.45 Those apparently simple terms are nothing of the sort. … Obviously, there are 
differences in what each of these Acts and definitions cover – but why? The cost to the community, business, 
the parties, and their lawyers, and the time for courts to work out which law applies have no rational or legal 
justification.46 
Statutory accretion continues ― recent examples include inter alia amendments to the Corporations Act 
implementing the FASEA Code of Ethics, The Design and Distribution Obligations, and Mortgage 
Broker best interest duty. All of these are paternalist in character. Despite Haynes’ plea for simplicity, 
the differing best interest, responsible lending, DDO, and FASEA regimes make for exactly the 
opposite. Each of them operates independently and require their own record keeping.  
 
41 Mark Leeming, ‘Equity: Ageless in the “Age of Statutes”’ (2015) 9(2) Journal of Equity 108. 
42 Hanrahan, (n 29) 12 citing Ku v Song [2007] 1189 [175] (Graham J). 
43 Hanrahan, (n 29) 91. 
 
44 Corporations Act 2001(Cth) s 1041H(1). 
45 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 12DA(1). 
46 See ‘Wingecarribee’ (n 10). 
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Each of these new regimes are fiduciary-like, but do not apply either the noun or adjective 
‘fiduciary’. Relevantly, as Donald insightfully noted in the FoFA best interest context: 
It is ironic, then that those same political processes that are privileging these nobler qualities [of 
fiduciaries] are in fact de-coupling the regulatory regimes from the general law antecedents in which 
those qualities were initially expressed. Political processes are ensuring that what the law expects 
of Mason J’s quintessential fiduciaries, or at least those whose activities encroach on areas of public 
policy, are regulated by multi-layered, highly specific, bespoke regulatory regimes that largely 
eclipse the proscriptions and prescriptions of the general law.47 
Many market participants are small, sometimes family firms. It will be difficult and unaffordable 
for some to negotiate the Stygian gloom of fecund multi-layered regulation. The FASEA 
interpretation of retail financial consumer is not consistent with the DDO and other 
interpretations. Neither is it clear that financial consumers will benefit ― paternalist policy does 
not encourage financial literacy. Unintended consequences of statutory accretion   may well be 
fewer services, fewer investment products and greater costs. 
The present danger is these tactical reforms be applied rigidly and onerously, becoming  ends in 
themselves, rather than tools to benefit the financial consumer.48 They are statutory reforms with 
significant and uncertain legal ramifications. 
The FASEA best interest obligations49 
FASEA was established by amendments to the Corporations Act.50 It is new law and does not 
replace existing best interest provisions:51 It is not an overlay on, or consistent with those 
provisions. FASEA is statutorily mandated to create and enforce a Code of Ethics.52 Its best interest 
obligations compulsorily apply to ‘relevant providers’, being financial planners (now a restricted 
term) and their firms, and to ‘monitoring bodies’. A monitoring body must have ‘sufficient 
resources and expertise to appropriately monitor and enforce compliance with the Code of 
Ethics…’53 This means that the relevant provider and the monitoring body must be able to decipher 
the Code’s best interest duties.  
Best interest duties appear in Standards 2 (broader, long-term interests, likely future 
circumstances, 3 (indirectly, through conflict of interest), 5 (client comprehension, 
 
47 M S Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’ (2013) Journal of Equity 142 [2]. 
48 See, eg, Rt Hon Lord Denning, ‘In the Court of Appeal ― The need for a new equity’, in The 
Denning Family Story (Centre for Commercial Law Bond University, 1981) 219, ch 10 227 [4][ii]. See 
also, Jesse Norman, Adam Smith ―What He thought, and Why it Matters (Allen Lane Penguin 
Random House, 2018) Ch 10 The Moral Basis of Commercial Society. 
49 David G Millhouse, ‘Best Interest Duties of Financial Advisers ― More Law, more Confusion’ 
(2020) Enterprise Governance e-Journal, Centre for Corporate Law, Bond University. 
50 Corporations Amendment (Professional Standards of Financial Advisers) Act 2017 (Cth). 
51 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Pt 7.7A Div 2 s 961B. 
52 Ibid s 921U(2)(b).  
53 Ibid s 921K.  
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appropriateness), 6 (broader, long-term interests), 7 (indirectly, through value for money), and 9 
(broad effects, broader long-term interest, likely circumstances, competence). The Code ‘must be 
read and applied as a whole’.54 Therefore, other provisions which themselves have been 
problematic in financial services law, become relevant to the interpretation of best interest duties. 
These other duties include truly informed consent and client comprehension.  
Doubtless, the Code and FASEA itself are well-intentioned responses to egregious behaviour 
identified by Hayne and others, quantified by this author.55 It seeks to convert an industry into a 
profession. However, the FASEA Code of Ethics is unlike Codes of various forms in other 
jurisdictions which operate on a comply-or-explain basis. 
In Australia a financial adviser may comply with the existing best interest provisions of the 
Corporations Act, with trustee obligations as if they were a fiduciary, maintain their ‘punctilio of 
honour’ and honesty, comply with their client contract, but nonetheless not be compliant with the 
FASEA Code of Ethics.  
Despite the publication of cameos describing various client circumstances,56 these are not cases, 
do not establish precedent, and are not law. There is no obligation for the publishers of these 
cameos to follow their own guidance in future litigation. In the meantime, financial advisers have 
unlimited personal liability – in quantum and in tenor, outcomes being dependent on future 
judicial determinations.  
Future boards of FASEA will have no choice but to come to grips with the legal uncertainty its Code 
of Ethics has created. To quote David Pollard, ‘Short Form Best Interest ― Mad, Bad and Dangerous 
to know’.57 The reading list for the compulsory examination58 contains no direct authoritative 
references to the central questions of best interest and, because of the way the Code is drafted, 
other law (for instance, what constitutes ‘informed consent’) which support the best interest 
duties. This raises doubts about the veracity of the examination for the adviser in their quest for 
legal certainty. 
Its objectives are doubtless pure, but its Code of Ethics does not have the jurisprudence and 
statutory support of pure liability civil law countries or the necessary supervisory architecture for 
effective implementation. These will take some years. In the meantime, the Code should operate 
 
54 FASEA, Financial Planners and Advisers Code of Ethics (Guidance FG002, 2019) 17 (‘FASEA 
2019’). 
55 Millhouse, (n 1). 
56 FASEA 2019 (n 54) 6. 
57 David Pollard, ‘The Short-form “Best Interests Duty” ― Mad, Bad and Dangerous to Know: Part 1 
― Background, Cowan v Scargill and MNRPF’ 106, 136, 147 quoting Lord Nicholls, “Trustees and 
their broader community: Where duty, morality and ethics converge’ (1995) 9 Trust Law International 
7 cited in M Scott Donald, Submission to Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, 
Superannuation and Financial Services Industry (21 September 2018) [3]. 
 
58 FASEA, Exam Preparation (Guidance FG003, 2019) 6–9. 
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on a comply-or-explain basis. FASEA does not deploy ‘fiduciary’ either as noun or adjective, but 
that is the legal implication of its Code of Ethics. This new law is de-coupled from its general law 
antecedents.59 
Financial Product Design and Distribution and Product Intervention Powers60 
The DDO Act amends the Corporations Act, National Consumer Credit Protection Act and the ASIC 
Act. Originally proposed by Murray61 in 2014, Its objective is to regulate the sale of financial 
products to retail consumers of those products. It seeks to do so by introducing statutory tests of 
appropriateness,62 target market determinations63, and financial product distribution conduct64 
by regulated persons65. ASIC may exempt persons or classes of persons.66 Orders may be sought 
and made to redress loss of damage to financial consumers including declarations that contract be 
void or void ab initio.67 There is some subjectivity ― ’[i]n considering whether a financial product 
has resulted in, or will or is likely to result in significant detriment to retail clients…’68 Civil 
penalties apply.69 Similar amendments are made to the NCCP Act. 
Financial products include home mortgages, savings accounts, term deposits, prospectus and PDS 
offers of securities, hybrids, derivatives, all financial products regulated by the ASIC Act in respect 
of conscionability and consumer protection, and NCCPA products. In short, those products around 
which modern life exists. 
A more useful approach might be reform of the three overlapping typologies of investor with ASIC 
using its exemption powers. 
Mortgage broker best interest duty70 
‘Mortgage broker’, as with financial adviser/planner is now a defined term. The best interest duty 
is in addition to responsible lending rules, and where relevant, DDO compliance and FASEA 
standards ― these compliance obligations will depend on the business model of the broker. The 
new law eliminates the transactional implication of ‘broker’. The provision of any ‘credit 
 
59 See especially Donald, (n 47). 
60 Treasury Laws Amendment (Design and Distribution Obligations and Product Intervention Powers 
Act 2019 (Cth). 
61 David Murray, Financial System Inquiry Final Report (Australia Treasury, 2014) 198–205 
(‘Murray’). 
62 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Div 2 s 994B(8). 
63 Ibid s 994B. 
64 Ibid ss 994A, 994D, 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid s 994L. 
67 Ibid s 994Q. 
68 Ibid s 1023E(1). 
69 Ibid s 1023Q. 
70 Financial Sector Reform (Hayne Royal Commission Response ― Protecting Consumers (2019 
Measures) Act 2020 (Cth). It amends the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 
158LA and 158LE. 
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assistance’71 which triggers the best interest obligation is not the same as personal financial advice 
but the boundaries and the compliance requirements inevitably will overlap. There is no ‘safe 
harbour’ prescriptive defence in the application of this best interest duty.72 There is a statutory 
prohibition of contracting out of this duty.73  
Emulating other financial services law74 the best interest duty is different from management of 
conflicts of interest.75 It follows the Australian statutory tradition of prioritisation rather than 
prohibition, further entrenching the vertical integration model. These related and close party 
transactions are a prime cause of egregious behaviour.76  
The duty is subjective and may conflict with a client interpretation of their best interest77 ― 
fiduciary like, but not a fiduciary duty exercised by a status-based fiduciary. As with financial 
planners, it is possible to comply with other compliance obligations but not meet the best interest 
duty.78 
3. Principles-based supervision 
Hayne formulated six norms of conduct, ‘but the reflection [in statute] is piecemeal’.79 He recommended 
exceptions to norms of conduct be eliminated and should expressly state what fundamental norms … are 
being pursued … when detailed rules are made…80 The Commonwealth agreed.81 Parliament is yet to 
define ‘norms’ ― ‘when such norms are lacking, granting discretion to parties subject to principles-based 
regulation can become a blank che[que] for abuse’.82 Norms define the limits of discretion. The FASEA 
Code of Ethics and the mortgage broker best interest duty rely on a principles-based approach to regulation 
and attempt to define contextual norms, but because of drafting, without the rules-based support of general 
law antecedents. It is this jurisprudence which give legal form to the vague terms scattered with abandon 
throughout Australian financial services and products law. ‘Best interest’ is but one. 
 
 
71 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Mortgage brokers: Best interests duty 
(Regulatory Guide 0000, February 2020) RG 000 [105, 110] (‘ASIC 2020 Best interests’). 
72 Ibid RG 0000 [11]. 
73 Ibid RG 0000 [12]. See, eg, ASIC v Citigroup. 
74 See, eg, Australian Prudential Regulation Authority v Kelaher [2019] FCA 1521 (Jagot J) 
(‘Kelaher’). 
75 ASIC 2020 Best interests (n 71) [128]–[138]. 
76 Millhouse, (n 1) 187. 
77 ASIC Best interests (n 71) [16, 45]. 
 
78 Ibid [98]. 
79 Hayne, (n 3) vol 1 9. 
80 Ibid 496 recs 7.3 and 7.4. 
81 Australian Government, Restoring trust in Australia’s financial system ― The Government response 
to the Royal Commission into Misconduct in the Banking, Superannuation and Financial Services 
Industry (February 2019) 38 (‘Restoring Trust’). 
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Principles-based regulation is a spectrum of typologies with considerable scholarly debate.83 It is not self-
regulation.84 Nor is it ‘soft law’, having multiple interpretations including lack of sanction and light touch 
based on disclosure. Other typologies include new governance, co-regulation, and responsive regulation.85 
The objective is to lower compliance costs for the financial consumer, improve regulatory outcomes, 
enhance jurisdictional competitiveness, provide for flexibility in ambiguous cases and facilitate better 
enforcement ‘for infractions … [which] despite achieving technical compliance, violate the public 
interest.86 
 
Principles-based regulation, once norms are defined, requires interpretation by the stakeholding group ― 
requiring ‘considerable changes to the traditional regulatory culture’.87 This includes multi-disciplinary 
interpretive skills which have been lacking in the oversight of many Australian MIS. Principles-based 
regulation ‘derives its legitimacy from its collaborative, dialogic experience … it operates on … 
pragmatic, learning by doing experience…88 It is iterative. The regulator becomes a supervisory and 
educative ex ante stakeholder, defining norms and themes. This extends to not prescribing ‘specific 
examinations’.89 This posture reflects the complexity of financial systems and products which underpin a 
modern entrepreneurial economy. 
 
Australia is a long way from that outcome, its tentative evolution into principles-based law flawed. It 
relies on ‘creating ever-longer lists of prohibited behaviour or checklists of compliance-related best 
practices … [which] will not be effective if the basic culture of the firm does not foster law-abiding 
behaviour’.90 Australian law has legitimised the wrong behaviours. 
 
Principles-based regulation requires meaningful enforcement. Stakeholder acceptance results in 
consensus and regulatory penalty for acting outside of the norms. Conversely, acting within norms can 
legitimise reputation and add brand and economic value. Brand value in effect becomes social licence. In 
Australia, as Hayne demonstrated, that licence was shredded. Similarly, Germany when it adopted (but 
later revoked) non-traditional legal norms. 
 
 
83 See, eg, Lawrence A. Cunningham, ‘A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of “Principles-Based 
Systems” in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting’ (2007) Boston College Law School 
Research Paper No. 127 cited in Christie L. Ford, ‘New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-
Based Securities Regulation (2008) 45 American Business Law Journal 1, 10. 
84 Christie L. Ford, ‘Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2010) 55 McGill Law Journal 257, 283. 
85 Ibid 285. 
86 Barbara Hendrickson, Larry Markowitz, Shahen Mirakian, and Marty Vendalaien, ‘2009 Report of 
the Expert Panel on Securities Regulation in Canada’ CBA National Business Law Newsletter 4. 
87 Christie L. Ford, ‘Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis’ 
(2010) 55 McGill Law Journal 257, 288. 
88 Ibid 305. 
89 Christie L. Ford, ‘New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regulation (2008) 
45 American Business Law Journal 1, 15. 
 
90 Ibid 29. 
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4. Lessons from other jurisdictions 
The German (EU), Canada, US, UK, and Singapore jurisdictions demonstrate there is no one solution to 
the resolution of systemic problems in those jurisdictions and manifested in Australia. These experiences 
fall into two distinct categories ― strategic policy reforms and tactical statutory reforms.  
A study of comparative jurisdictions is insightful: ‘[C]ross-country differences in legal systems and 
accounting standards help to explain the cross-country differences in the development of financial 
intermediaries’.91 ‘[C]ountries with a German legal origin have better-developed financial 
intermediaries…’92 with particular insights into regulatory posture, fiduciary-equivalent obligation, and 
the relationship between regulation and corporate governance. Of the common law jurisdictions, Canada 
has the closest affinity with the traditional German civil law model. Germany has the closest pure liability 
model of relevant jurisdictions. When Germany in 2007 departed temporarily from its legal traditions in 
NBFE regulation, consequences were similar to those in Australia: ‘Heuschrecken’93 descended, 
necessitating reversion to legal traditions, now codified in EU statutes. 
These insights are of practical relevance. If emulated, they could significantly improve Australian law and 
regulation. They provide the basis for the re-establishment of investor trust and confidence and 
enhancement of national economic productivity. Inter-jurisdictional transfer difficulties can arise, but the 
more successful regulatory experiences in comparative jurisdictions provide reform options to address 
identified systemic deficiencies in Australia.  
 
The untreue94 principle, now codified in EU law and supported by the German Corporate Governance 
Code (GCGC) as general law governs intent. German directors are required to observe the spirit and intent 
of the law, not only its statutory manifestations, balanced by codified civil law counterweights. This 
architecture reflects fiduciary stewardship concepts. This is not so in Australia unless there is a broadened 
fiduciary relationship where, as in the UK, ‘[i]t [creative compliance] is essentially the practice of using 
the letter of the law to defeat its spirit, and to do so with impunity’.95 
 
For Australian investors, adoption of these doctrines would extend duties of advisers beyond present 
statutory best interest with a personal conduct obligation to explain, fully disclose, deal fairly and positively 
pursue their economic interests, now expressed in the FASEA Code of Ethics but without recourse to 
general law antecedents. German legal tradition has facilitated the maturity of its private banking sector, 
 
91 J Carmichael and M Pomerleano, The development and regulation of Non-Bank Financial 
Institutions (Report, World Bank, 2002) 13, citing Ross Levine, Norman Loaya and Thorsten Beck, 
‘Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes’ (World Bank Development Research 
Group, 1999). 
92 Ibid 199. 
93 Locusts [author’s trans]. 
94 Luca Enriques, ‘Related Party Transactions: Policy Options and Real-World Challenges (with a 
Critique of the European Commission Proposal)’ (2015) 16 European Business Organisation Law 
Review 24. 
95 Simon Ashby, ‘The Turner Review on the Global Banking Crisis: A Response from the Financial 
Services Forum’ (Nottingham University, 2009) 17. 
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yet to be emulated in Australia. In Germany, investors are now consumers of financial products and 
services, not capital suppliers. This is a completely different posture to previous Australian market 
practices. 
 
Canada has significantly extended fiduciary doctrine across the investment chain, adopted Responsive 
Regulation, financial advisers having a direct, prescriptive fiduciary nexus with whom they deal. By 
contrast, regulation in the US is a politicised, convoluted, unresolved, inconsistent mess blowing with the 
political winds of the day. Its fragmented regulatory architecture, which has led to jurisdiction shopping, 
‘has been heavily discredited’.96  
 
Singapore has a national strategy of being a global financial hub, using other regulatory methods. These 
include statutory personal liability in financial advice, personal fiduciary liability for directors of actively 
managed collective investment schemes (CIS) regulated by its Business Trusts Act97 (the equivalent of 
Australian unregistered MIS), and much greater barriers to entry for market participants. 
In Germany, BaFin98 does have wide ranging principles-based powers,99 based on concepts of ‘natural 
politeness’.100 This regulatory model is culturally specific. It follows enlightened post-war legal concepts 
designed to promote a civil society, redolent of MAS’ objectives in Singapore. Hanrahan and Kingsford 
Smith101 insightfully favour a similar approach over Australias’ box-ticking regulatory culture. Germany 
‘has realised that a lot can be gained by employing principle-based regulation’.102  
Similarity with Singapore extends to practical assessment of what is possible: ‘Financial supervisors cannot 
be expected to reduce the probability of financial intermediaries’ excessive risk taking to zero, nor can they 
start enforcement actions every time they are alerted about a possible compliance issue’.103 
The UK has attempted to quality assure its investment chain by proposing substantially extended fiduciary 
obligation, eliminating legal ability to contract out of that obligation, and extending it to end beneficiary. 
To date, those attempts have failed. The need for reform was accepted by the UK authorities, but did not 
extend to the adoption of statutory fiduciary duties of those in the investment chain.104 Rather, best interest 
 
96 Symposium, ‘Global Financial Crisis: The Way Forward’ (9 April 2010) Bond University; 
Carmichael, ‘Regulatory Lessons from the Crisis’, above n 11. 
97 Business Trusts Act (Singapore, Act 30 of 2004). 
98 Bundesaufsichtsamt für Finanzdienstleistungen [Federal Financial Services Authority]. 
99 Securities Trading Act 1998 (Germany) (‘WpHG’) §§ 15(2)(2), 20a(5)(5). 
100 R Veil, ‘Enforcement of Capital Markets Law in Europe ― Observations from a civil law country’ 
(2010) 11 European Business Organisation Law Review 409, 414. 
101 Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘ASIC regulation for the investor as consumer’ (2011) 29 (5) Companies 
and Securities Law Journal 336;  Dimity Kingsford Smith, ‘A harder nut to crack? Responsive 
Regulation in the financial services sector’ (2011) 44 (3) University of British Columbia Law Review 
702;  Pamela Hanrahan, ‘ASIC and managed investments’ (2011) 29 Companies and Securities Law 
Journal 297. 
102 Veil, (n 100) 417. 
103 Luca Enriques and Gerard Hertig, ‘Improving the governance of Financial Supervisors’ (2011) 12 
European Business Organisation Law Review 357, 375. 
104 Law Commission UK, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Advisers (Consultation Paper No 215, 22 
October 2013) 4. (‘Fiduciary Duties UK 2013’). 
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is interpreted as best long term interest consistent with the Companies Act.105 It ‘enshrines …”enlightened 
shareholder value”’106 and ‘generally prevailing standards of decent behaviour’.107 These standards 
incorporate concepts of stewardship108 into governance requiring reporting or publicly disclosing 
compliance.109 Whilst administrative, voluntary (except for listed companies) and resting in the duty of 
care, it implies the application of fiduciary principles to participants in the investment chain rather than an 
explicit statutory fiduciary duty. It also implies an extension of those fiduciary principles from proscription 
to positive duties. ‘Some stakeholders argue[d] that stewardship should be “an explicit part of fiduciary 
duty”’.110 The present position is a voluntary adoption of the Stewardship Code with explanations required 
for non-adoption,111 (as in Germany). 
The Canadian regulatory system has much to offer Australia in its quest for reform of regulation. Canada ‘has led 
the way in the common law world in extending fiduciary obligations and remedies’,112 to eliminate vague 
assertion[s] of fiduciary expectations by the community not met in practice. That phenomenon is not restricted to 
Australia: ‘[f]iduciary law everywhere has eluded a sound theory of liability’.113 ‘While inequality, dependence, 
and vulnerability are now routinely identified as qualities of fiduciary relationships that justify fiduciary duties, 
their meaning and salience have not been consistently stated or properly explained’.114  
In Canada and elsewhere there were implicit community fiduciary assumptions.115 These have subsequently been 
given definition in Canada, requiring the existence of discretionary power of the fiduciary which can affect the 
legal position of the beneficiary.116  
US States have different interpretations of fiduciary duty. As a general proposition, broader than those in 
Australia: Delaware classifies duty of care and good faith as fiduciary alongside loyalty. Some require a surety 
bond to underwrite the obligations of the fiduciary. Imposition of strict fiduciary standards in some states does 
not adversely impact financial service providers. Empirical research finds 
 
105 Companies Act 2006 (UK) s 172. 
106 Fiduciary Duties UK (n 104) 63. 
107 Ibid 5. 
108 The UK Stewardship Code (Financial Reporting Council, 2012) Principle 1. 
109 Conduct of Business Source Book (Financial Conduct Authority UK) 2.2.3R. 
110 Fiduciary Duties UK 2013 (n 104) 144 citing Lord Myners (Third Report of the Select Committee 
on Business, Innovation and Skills UK, 2013–14) House of Commons 603 Evidence 19. 
111 Law Commission UK, Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries (Consultation Paper No 350, 
30 June 2014) [5.83]. 
112 Paul B Miller, ‘A Theory of Fiduciary Liability’ (2011) 56(2) McGill Law Journal 235 [4]. 
113 Ibid [5]. 
114 Ibid [48]. 
115 Guerin v Canada [1984] 13 DLR (4th) 321; See also Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corp 
[1984] 156 CLR [72] (Mason, Gibbs, Dawson JJ). 
116 Galambos v Perez [1998] 166 DLR (4th) 475. 
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no statistical difference between the two groups117 in the percentage of lower-income and high-wealth clients, the 
ability to provide a broad range of [financial] products including those that provide commission compensation, the 
ability to provide tailored advice, and the cost of compliance.118 
This is important research for Australia where lobby groups decry high regulatory standards as anti-
entrepreneurial. Fiduciary law impacts more than those directly party to the fiduciary relationship. Meeting 
community expectations is a matter of public interest and can be an outcome of fiduciary law and breaches of it 
in those relationships.119  
Reliance on common law and lack of a statutory uniform standard has not prevented and may have induced a code 
of self-regulation consistent with ISO 9000 Quality Management System standards. This culminates in a ‘periodic 
table of global fiduciary practices’.120 This Global Fiduciary Standard, in stark contrast to some Australian 
statutes, recognises that ‘procedural prudence alone does not complete a fiduciary’s obligations’.121 It notes that: 
the vast majority of the world’s liquid wealth is in the hands of investment fiduciaries and the success or failure of 
investment fiduciaries can have a material impact on the fiscal health of any country122 … earning trust is not simply 
a matter of recent, superior performance, dazzling presentations, or personal relationships: it is a matter of 
organisational integrity and process driven by prudent practices.123  
The Global Fiduciary Standard is an attempt to quality assure the investment chain. It encompasses all those 
statutorily recognised in US Federal and State law.124 It provides a managerial basis for international 
harmonisation and application of fiduciary principles in governance. The Global Fiduciary Standard is highly 
prescriptive requiring positive actions.125 Similarly, the UN Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century Program 
concludes: ‘failing to consider all long-term investment value drivers, including ESG issues, is a failure of 
fiduciary duty’.126 Necessarily, this implies positive actions.  
 
117 These two groups were a sample of financial advisers drawn from states with no fiduciary standard 
and from those with strict fiduciary standards. 
118 Michael S Finker and Thomas Patrick Langdon, ‘The Impact of the Broker-Dealer Fiduciary 
Standard on Financial Advice’ (Elsevier, 2012) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2019090>. 
119 Cheryl L Wade, ‘Fiduciary Duty and the Public Interest’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law Review 
1191 quoting Tamar T Frankel, Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 52. For a fuller 
discussion, see Symposium, ‘The Role of Fiduciary Law and Trust in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Conference Inspired by the Work of Tamar Frankel’ (Boston University School of Law, 29 October 
2010). 
120 Centre for Fiduciary Excellence LLC and fi360 inc 112013, Prudent Practices for Investment 
Managers: Defining a Global Fiduciary Standard of Excellence, Worldwide edition, 2013. This edition 
is supported by extensive handbooks and working documents. 
121 Ibid 8. 
122 Ibid 6. 
123 Ibid 7. 
124 For instance, but not exclusively those providing advice or asset management under the Investment 
Advisers Act 1940 (US), Pension Protection Act 2006 (US), and State securities laws. 
125 David G Millhouse, Corporate Governance in Non-Bank Financial Entities 
(LexisNexisButterworths, 2019) ch 6 [6.120]. 
126 United Nations Environment Program ‘Fiduciary Duty in the 21st Century’ (2015) 
<http://www.unpri.org/download_report/6131>. This author’s italics. 
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Harmonisation with international standards ― UCITS and the Australian Funds Passport Regime 
To reduce Australia’s outlier status, Australian law applying to financial products and financial services could 
be harmonised with similar jurisdictions. This includes not only adherence to Global Fiduciary Standards 
principles but also to IOSCO and MiFID regimes. These already operate internationally. Australian financial 
product disclosure documents could adhere to UCITS principles to enable the sale of Australian financial 
products in other jurisdictions. Conversely, Australia could permit the domestic sale of international UCITS 
compliant financial products to stimulate financial product competition. There has been some progress with 
‘passporting’ but this remains far from complete,127 and high barriers to entry make it very restrictive. 
5. Does law underpin a modern economy? 
Some authors128 claim causality between legal origins and financial market outcomes, a primary legal 
distinction being common and civil law origins.  
Legal protections not only facilitate diversification of financial commitments by the existing investor base, but 
also and in addition, must encourage small investors to put their savings in equity. This then leads to the 
broadening of the investor base which is associated with bigger and deeper markets. Thus law begets markets.129 
Comparative law research supports this conclusion, with differing legal methods achieving similar desired 
outcomes for investors. Similarly, differing jurisdictions influence market practices using methods other than 
legal tools to implement policy reform: ‘law is hardly ever the only or even the culprit of a crisis. Conversely, 
legal solutions are not necessarily the most important remedy … actual change is contingent on non-legal 
factors...’130 The importance of behavioural economics research is understated and under-researched in 
Australia, where emphasis on statutory accretion serves as ‘diagnostic tools for policy reform’.131 Emphasis 
on objective strategy based on multiple tools would serve to reduce the impact of interest group driven 
politicised policy.  
 
127 Originally proposed by Johnson in 2009, legislation for Asian Region Funds Passport (ARFP) and 
Corporate Collective Investment Vehicles (CCIV) incorporates new chapters 8A and 8B in the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Corporations Amendment (Asian Region Funds Passport) Act 2018 (Cth) 
received Royal Assent on 29th June 2019. Treasury Laws Amendment (Corporate Collective 
Investment Vehicle) Bill 2018 remains in the legislature. These allow for multi-jurisdictional financial 
product distribution (New Zealand, Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Philippines, Japan 
and Australia have participated in consultations). The Passport is based on mutual recognition 
principles. Related party transactions are regulated in the home country. UCITS principles are accorded 
worlds’ best practice for custody. The legislation provides for the SLE model in both corporate and 
limited partnership forms with directors duties giving priority to investors over shareholders. 
128  Katharina Pistor, ‘Rethinking the “Law and Finance” Paradigm’ (2009) Brigham Young University 
Law Review 1113. 
129 Ibid 1650. 
130 Ibid 1669. 
131 Ibid 1658. 
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The Law Matters thesis132 postulates that jurisprudence underpins a competitive economy. The law can 
facilitate economic development and not simply coerce, regulate and control.133 Evidence can be found in 
Europe. EU law reform of retail investor capital markets was estimated to increase EU GDP by ‘between 0.5 
and 0.7% [pa].’134  
The Law Matters: its manifest deficiencies have been one reason for the paucity of global firms originating or 
based in Australia. This has led to fewer on-shore investment opportunities for superannuation funds, capital 
flight to other jurisdictions, entrepreneur flight, suboptimal GDP growth, reducing skilled employment 
opportunities for the population. Australia,  
needs a system that evades the risk aversion that has become common practice and returns to our roots as an 
entrepreneurial community … In the 21st century regulation needs to avoid paternalism without completely abandoning 
prudent protection of interest.135 
Whilst law matters, it is problematic to assume that government regulation alone can drive market behaviour. 
In practice intertwined European and national jurisdiction mix of soft law through self-regulation, co-
regulation, and government regulation, disciplined by the primacy of civil law principles and the statutory 
powers of minority shareholders produces results: ‘Firms begin to avail themselves of corporate governance 
principles codes, guidelines and laws, thereby leaving the “box-ticking” phase behind’.136 This is a salutary 
lesson for present Australian practice.  
 
6. Framework for implementation 
Australian public policy is at a cross-roads. There is a considerable risk that the egregious behaviour quantified 
by this author and other entities examined by Hayne will result in more statutory intervention, more regulatory 
intervention (‘Why not litigate?’) a less entrepreneurial economy, higher costs, reduced availability of capital, 
and fewer market participants. Perhaps not a return to oligopoly, but nonetheless more restrictive and less 
internationally competitive. The Productivity Commission proposes to extend ASIC’s mandate to 
competition.137 Whilst acknowledging the need for substantive ASIC reform,138 it proposes to repeat the error 
 
132 Brian R Cheffins, 'Corporate Law and ownership structure: A Darwinian Link?' (2002) 25(2) 
University of New South Wales Law Journal 346 [2] citing Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means, The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property (Macmillan, 1932). 
133 Justice Michael Kirby, 'The company director: past, present, and future' (Speech delivered at the 
Australian Institute of Company Directors, Tasmanian Division, Hobart, 1998). 
134 Friedrich Heinemann and Mathias Jopp, The benefits of a Working European Retail Market for 
Financial Services (Report to the European Financial Services Round Table, Institute für Europäische 
Politik, Berlin, 2002); See generally Moloney, Building a Retail Investment Culture through Law: The 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2005) 6 European Business Organisation Law Review 341, 
354 citing Heinemann and Jopp (n 134). See also below (n 258). 
135 Australian Association of Angel Investors, Equity Crowdfunding; Response to the Treasury 
Consultation Paper (2015). 
136 Joseph A McCahery and Erik P M Vermuelen, ‘Private Equity and Hedge Fund Activism: 
Explaining the Differences in Regulatory Responses’ (2008) 9 European Business Organisation Law 
Review 535, 537. 
137 Productivity Commission 2018 (n 4). 
138 Ibid 24. 
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identified by Ashby in 2009 following UK regulator reform in 2007: ‘our regulators have been part of the 
problem’.139  
2020 is the end of the beginning of modern Australian financial reform which began in 1981. Choice of 
road is at hand. Parliament must decide. Haynes’ important systemic recommendations140 are consistent 
with this paper. It proposes the ‘Age of Statutes’ evolve to the ‘Age of Trust’, firmly rooted in the fertile 
soil of Scott Donalds’ ‘nobler qualities’141 of fiduciaries. Those fiduciary qualities are implicit in 
community expectation of trust and loyalty on whom they rely, forming the basis of a modern regulatory 
regime. 
What does Australia wish to achieve as a modern nation? Does it wish to develop its modern story as an 
entrepreneurial economy competing with its global peers? Does it remain largely reliant on resources 
extraction and low value employment? Does it want to leverage off innovation and skills? Does it want to 
develop its SME sector? The answers to these questions determine future public policy in financial services 
and products regulation. Does Australia continue its tradition of statutory accretion which has allowed 
egregious behaviour to flourish? Or do the insights in this paper provide a framework? This the cross-road 
that Parliament must now traverse. It is a binary choice. 
If the former road, then this paper predicts that the future will be similar to the recent past. If not, then 
Australia must undertake reform of financial regulation as proposed in this paper. Entrepreneurial freedoms 
must be matched by participant acceptance of fiduciary obligation to guide and enforce market conduct 
standards ― the two are symbiotic. This is evolutionary, some may say revolutionary. It is not 
revolutionary: it returns, as Hayne proposed, Australian financial regulation to a positive culture of trust, 
honesty and fair dealing.142 That is a culture that provides for entrepreneurship, business growth and future 
employment. 
However, it is not merely a matter of law, something missed by those who prescribe statutory remedy for 
every ill. That is the easier route ― the quick fix, the instant medication. This paper identifies the more 
thoughtful route, assuredly taking time to effect cultural change, but of a permanence based on common 
easily comprehended principles. 
Parliament has yet to debate these issues. If it does, then it must confront the distinction between fiduciary 
and non-fiduciary duties and recognise the power of fiduciary law. Confused parliamentary leadership has 
facilitated corruption of the regulatory system.’[I]t is important [to] preserve fiduciary law … at least until 
 
139 Ashby, (n 95), 33. 
140 Hayne (n 3), recs 73 and 74, vol 1, 494-6. 
141 Donald, (n 47) 142 [1]. 
142 See, eg, Bray v Ford [1895–99] All ER 1009, 1011. Lord Herschell noted that: ‘human nature being 
what it is, there is a danger … of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest 
rather than duty, and thus prejudicing those whom he was bound to protect. It has, therefore, been 
deemed expedient to la[y] down this positive [inflexible] rule.’ 
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a basis for expanding fiduciary law so that it incorporates prescriptive obligations is articulated rationally 
and accepted’.143  
Four strategic themes in Law Reform  
This paper proposes strategic re-order of Australia’s regulatory architecture supported by effective, 
untainted and efficient corporate governance for effective implementation ― statutory amendment alone 
will not suffice.  
As Hayne also identified, reform is a system-wide view; it is doctrinal, requiring absolute obedience to the 
spirit of the law to reflect community expectation of fiduciary trust and loyalty. It removes incentives for 
malfeasance and improves incentives for lifting standards rather than reliance on proscriptive and 
prescriptive box-ticking compliance alone. Reform is designed to enhance financial sector performance for 
financial consumers and applies to all elements in the investment chain, including its regulators. 
The four strategic reform themes are:  
 Re-establishment of trust in the investment chain through fiduciary obligation;  
 Architecture for implementation at the financial consumer level ― financial planning and wealth 
management as a profession;  
 Market conduct regulation for the 21st century; and 
 Corporate governance reform ― related party transactions and conflicts of interest. 
Implementation of the four reform themes will require national leadership ― from Parliament given form 
by the Executive. It will require four implementation teams for four years: stakeholder support is essential. 
Some of these will overlap. A senior Parliamentary ministerial champion supported by a special purpose 
Reference Group with Commonwealth financial support noting a similar proposal from the ALRC. It could 
be based on the inoperative but extant Financial Sector Advisory Council. Implementation should be 
considered as a decade long policy objective working in tandem with the Council of Financial Regulators 
(CFR). The CFR should have an enhanced mandate to supervise implementation within its regulator 
stakeholder group. Within each theme, specific tactical legislative interventions are needed. The Corporate 
Law Economic Reform Program (CLERP) provides a precedent. These four themes will require 
considerable statutory support, for consistency guided by the Reference Group and the responsible 
minister. The CFR will consider and publicly explain in a comprehensive transparent way what the impact 
of the reform themes are. It is: 
a vehicle for improving regulators’ ability to influence expectation in financial markets. It can build trust in 
the actions of regulators. But of greatest value is its capacity to be a forum that can test the proposition of a 
macroprudential intervention…144 
 
143 Matthew Harding, ‘Two fiduciary fallacies’ (2007) 2 Journal of Equity 1, 25. 
144 Productivity Commission 2018 (n 4). 
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This is consistent with the need for a competition advocate, and consistent with this thematic reform 
program, not separate from it. ‘For ASIC to act as a champion of financial system competition would 
require a clear change … and a change in its regulatory culture’,145 extending ‘towards advancing 
consumer’s interest in financial products … That it has not already done so is of concern’.146  
Some stakeholders will be challenged: others, the qualitative research identifies,147 will be supportive. 
All stakeholders must focus on the uncompromised needs of investors and beneficiaries in the investment 
chain, not their own sectoral interests. There must be commonality of objective disciplined by a 
financially empowered literate community led by champions.  
7. Re-establishment of trust in the investment chain through fiduciary obligation 
Australian courts have previously resisted extension of fiduciary obligations ‘to be used for creating new 
forms of civil wrong [being an] ‘unsatisfactory development of the law of fiduciary obligation’.148 ‘It is 
questionable in my view whether this heralded development in our law is a desirable or necessary one [in 
the trust company context]’149 However, elimination of systemic deficiencies in Australia’s financial 
advice sector will require such extensions of fiduciary obligation. Judicial opinion where fiduciary 
obligation has been limited to strict proscriptions is contextually narrow and should not limit non-
contextual cases to those narrow confines. There are precedents in Australian case law based on contract,150 
vulnerability and reliance,151 reasonable expectation,152 and in the extension of trustee director statutory 
fiduciary liability to Australian superannuation entity members personally.153  
Fiduciary obligation is the mirror of community expectation of trust in those that advise them or manage 
their funds. ‘Fiduciary law cannot be subsumed under contract … a violation of fiduciary duties carries a 
“moral taint”. … Unlike contract, trust is a moral relationship; its unwarranted violation is a moral 
principle’.154 In Australia, there is a trust deficit.  
 
Since an underlying motivation of the imposition of fiduciary obligations is to maintain public confidence 
in socially important relationships like that of investment, the routine circumvention of such obligations 





147 Millhouse, (n 6) app 1. 
148 Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) [No 3] [2012] WASCA 157 [901] (Lee 
J, Drummond AJA). 
149 Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, AS Securities 
Limited and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [78] (Finn J). 
150 Hospital Products Ltd v US Surgical Corp [1984] 156 CLR [72] (Gibbs J). 
151 Ibid [142] (Dawson J). 
152 Mabo v State of Queensland (no 2) [1992] 175 CLR 1 [200]–[201] (Toohey J). 
153 Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (Cth) ss 52A(d), 55A(4A), 52(8), 29VN (a), (b). 
154 Richard Holton, ‘Fiduciary Relations and the Nature of Trust’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
Review 991, 994 quoting Tamar T Frankel, Fiduciary Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 238. 
155 Andrew Tuch, ‘Investment Banks as Fiduciaries: Implications for Conflicts of Interest’ (2005) 29 
Melbourne University Law Review 478, 516. 
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Fiduciary relationships can and should be found at every point in the investment chain where there is 
discretion, information, reliance or advice. The imposition of statutory fiduciary duty directly in the 
investment chain has not been previously viewed with undiluted pleasure.156 However, ‘superannuation 
entity director’ is now enshrined in the SIS Act with direct fiduciary obligations to the beneficiary,157 and 
in the Corporations Act158 for MIS securities holders. The need to apply fiduciary law to investment banks 
(in their various formulations as financial conglomerates) has long been recognised in Australia.159 The 
need is to re-establish foregone trust, confidence and respect in fiduciaries required to act as if they should 
be trusted. This outcome is unlikely to be achieved with prescriptive administrative regulation. It is ‘not 
just a policy choice, but an architectural choice about how our law fits together’.160  
 
The preferred view (which is the position in comparative jurisdictions) is that the contextual judicial 
determinations ‘do not apply to the [non-contextual] status-based fiduciary relationships such as that 
between director and company’.161 This is a fundamental point of law striking directly at the mismatch 
between community expectations and market practice of those in the investment chain. ‘It is a duty of 
fundamental importance’,162 being an essential part of undivided loyalty. 
Scholarly research concludes: 
The existing state of Australian law in its approach to fiduciary duties lacks clarity and cohesion, 
particularly as concerns directors. Implementation of the proposals in this thesis would bring certainty and 
consistency … it paves the way for the rethinking of modern fiduciary theory’.163 
 
This, and Langford’s other proposals for ‘extensive international analysis … [and for] corporate 
governance … organised and categorised around fiduciary duties’164 are entirely consistent with the 
analysis of this author.165 The essential power of fiduciary law is its very fluidity.166  
 
 
156 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v AS Nominees Limited, Ample Funds Limited, 
AS Securities Pty Ltd and Peter Grenfell Windsor [1995] FCA 1663 [77]–[78] (Finn J). 
157 Superannuation Legislation Amendment (Trustee Obligations and Prudential Standards) Act 2012 
(Cth) Explanatory Memorandum [1.33]. 
158 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 601FD, 601FC. 
159 See, eg, Tuch, (n 155). 
160 Joshua Getzler, ‘“As If” – Accountability and Counterfactual Trust’ (2011) 91 Boston University 
Law Review 973, 988. 
161 R T Langford, ‘The duty of directors to act bona fide in the interests of the company: a positive 
fiduciary duty?’, 231. 
162 R P Austin, H A J Ford and I M Ramsay (eds), Company Directors – Principles of Law and 
Corporate Governance (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2005) [11.1] cited in Langford, ‘The duty of 
directors to act bona fide in the interests of the company’, (n 161) 232; see especially Langford, The 
Bona Fide Fiduciary Loyalty of Australian Company Directors, PhD thesis, Faculty of Law Monash 
University, 2013, 313–314 [10.12], [5.3.1.1] citing Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical 
Corporation [1984] HCA 64; 156 CLR 41 (Mason J, Gibbs CJ). 
163 Langford, (n 161) 314 [10.13]. 
164 Ibid 313 [10.12]. 
165 Millhouse, (n 6) chs 3 (empirical analysis), 5 (international comparative law), 6 (conclusions). 
166 Millhouse, (n 125) [5.16]. 
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Should Haynes’ systemic recommendations find favour, then fiduciary qualities will regain their primacy 
at law and set Australia on the harmonisation path with international fiduciary standards. It would 
reinforce the power of fiduciary law to the benefit of investors and beneficiaries so manifestly poorly 
served by existing statutes. Fiduciary law should not be ‘mere polyfilla’ to support inconsistent and 
incomplete statutes: ‘clear recognition of the fiduciary nature [of the best interest] and more expansive 
operation of the duty’167 is essential. As she opines, the best interest duty is ‘the central fiduciary duty of 
directors, which operates as a catch-all duty …’ The present proscriptive-prescriptive typology is not 
useful to that community. Neither is it consistent with international trends, with comparative 
jurisdictions, or the Global Fiduciary Standard.  
 
When considering the re-establishment of trust, other jurisdictions follow one of two paths: (a) accretive 
statutory reform, or (b) the application of behavioural economics theory to regulation, leading to ex ante 
industry-based regulation underpinned by universal fiduciary obligations. Presently, Australia, the UK, 
and the US pursue accretive statutory reform, whilst Canada, Germany (with EU overlay), apply different 
legal mechanisms reflecting their different legal traditions. These are not without criticism.168 Singapore 
pursues a culturally nuanced approach drawing upon legal tradition but implements German standards 
of personal responsibility supported by culpa in contrahendo and untreue principles. 
The deterrent effect of fiduciary law requires two components: these are (a) prohibition not prioritisation 
by informed consent; and (b) prescriptive and positive duties to include financial best interest, improved 
disclosure and education of the client. Informed consent should not be ‘a merely formal process’.169 In 
Canada, the implementation of the Client Relationship Model (CRM) model requires financial advisers 
to tutor their clients as they advise them. It has a scholarly basis in behavioural economics research, 
increases the financial literacy of the community, and provides the human resources ex ante at the 
interface when and where they are needed. 
 
As Heydon170 also noted, cultural change to ensure ‘reasonable expectations’171 of fiduciary obligations 
and principles is a generational task. That loyalty to others, enshrined in the general law but subsumed 
by statute and contract, should require reinforcement is a sad reflection on the efficacy of Parliament. It 
is a public policy issue to enforce effective disclosure, require effective conflicts avoidance and balance 
information and vulnerability asymmetries between provider and client.172  
 
167 Langford, (n 161) 242. 
168 Lisa Zhou, ‘Fiduciary Law, Non-Economic Interests and Amici Curiae’ (2008) 32(3) Melbourne 
University Law Review 1158. 
169 J Getzler, ‘”As If” ― Accountability and Counterfactual Trust’ (2011) 91 Boston University Law 
Review 973, 989. 
170 Heydon (n 2). 
171 Tuch, (n 155) 483. 
172 Ibid 505. 
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How statutes reduce regulatory efficacy: subsuming of fiduciary principles by statutory accretion  
Law reform requires: (a) simplification and harmonisation of the various statutes; and, (b) renewed focus 
on fiduciary principles of propriety, honesty, and uncompromised loyalty. ‘The fiduciary obligation is a 
demanding standard of propriety in conduct that is unequalled elsewhere in the law’,173 requiring 
‘complete loyalty to the service of another’s interests’.174 Any discussion of law reform needs to 
comprehend these two themes.  
 
The first imperative is better understood by reflecting on analysis of international practice in comparable 
jurisdictions and significant and recurring judicial frustration in Australia.175 
The second imperative will require a national sustained education campaign over a sustained period to 
inculcate industry participants in director, trustee, and officer roles with these fiduciary concepts. Perhaps 
a role for a reformed FASEA. Misuse of ‘fiduciary’ the adjective by politicians and lobby groups has 
resulted in a mismatch of community expectations based on common usage and the legal reality of 
fiduciary law in Australia.176  
Presently, comprehension and application of fiduciary principles is not widespread, given lip-service, 
often ignored, eliminated in contract, and subservient to adherence to specific statutory provisions. 
Compliance with the letter of the law but not adherence to its spirit or community expectation. There is 
a public policy question as to whether Australian statutes ‘adequately protects those to whom the general 
law would grant protection, if enforced, afforded by the fiduciary relationship’.177  
In many cases, ‘contracts mean that fiduciary expectations are not legitimate…’.178 Judicial reticence to 
interfere in arms-length contracting parties179 where best interest of clients are contractually overridden 
does not assist the vulnerable to mount equitable challenges to malfeasance.  
 
173 Ibid 479 citing Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 [16] (Millett LJ). 
174 Ibid 481 citing P D Finn, ‘The Fiduciary Principle’ in T G Youdan (ed), Equity, Fiduciaries and 
Trusts (Carswell, 1989) 1, 27. 
175 See, eg, ASIC v Vines [2006] NSWSC [14] (Austin J): ‘The application of the statutory language is 
difficult, because of the very wide range of activities conducted in corporate form’. Rares J succinctly 
expressed his frustrations with statutory accretion in Wingecarribee Shire Council v Lehman Brothers 
Australia Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 1028 (Rares J) noting the Corporations Act and ASIC Act have 
lengthy and different definitions of financial services and financial products: he questions the costs of 
statutory complexity to the community: see Millhouse (n 125) [4.17]–[4.19] . S 62 of the SIS Act is 
‘complex, clumsy and lacks clarity … it takes over 900 words to say that a superannuation fund must 
be set up to provide benefits …’ quoted in Anthony Asher, Superannuation ‘objective’ likely to be 
captured by industry (The Conversation, April 2016), <https://the conversation.com>. 
176 M Scott Donald, ‘Regulating for fiduciary qualities of conduct’ (2013) 7(2) Journal of Equity 142 
[1]. 
177 Tuch, (n 155) 514. 
178 Fiduciary Duties of investment Intermediaries, Law Commission UK (Paper No 350, 30 June 2014) 
[8.48] (‘Intermediaries UK 2014’) 
179 Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation [1984] HCA 64 [100]–[102] 71 (Gibbs 
CJ, Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ) citing Paul Dainty Pty Ltd v National Tennis Centre Trust 
(1990) 22 FCR 495, 515–516. 
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Even where the relationship is contractual (as it normally will be), the matter is too important to be left 
entirely to the agreement of the parties and the interpretation of that agreement … A too casual failure to 
recognise the requirements of a fiduciary position, and sometimes a short sighted assumption that all 
relevant duties are prescribed in contract, can be and has been responsible for serious misbehaviour in the 
financial markets and elsewhere, as shown by many litigated cases in the last quarter-century.180 
Empirical analysis demonstrates that the ‘Age of Statutes’181 has not prevented, in any meaningful sense, 
an elimination of systemic problems ― they may have added to the problem.182 Statutory evolution has 
been and remains politically contested, its effectiveness reduced as lobby groups pursue their particular 
interests.  
Accretive statutory change is not enough. Whilst ‘we now live in an age of statutes and not of the common 
law,’183 it is not statute that has eliminated systemic failures and their cyclical manifestations. 
‘[C]omplying merely with the regulatory requirements may well leave the investment bank in breach of 
the fiduciary obligation’.184 Cyclical corruption rooted in cultural mores185 requires excision, not 
management. This requires a rethink of assumptions of robustness in statutory construction,186 and of the 
embracing of ‘principles drawn from the law of trusts and from fiduciary law...’187 In economics 
terminology, there is market failure: ‘These problems are at the core of the structure of the financial 
markets’.188 
 
8. Architecture for implementation at the financial consumer level ― financial planning and wealth 
management as a profession 
 
Ripoll189 recommended the Corporations Act be amended to explicitly include a statutory fiduciary duty 
for licenced financial advisers. This generated debate as to why a financial adviser should have a statutory 
fiduciary duty at all. ASIC’s submission to Ripoll proposed that ‘legislation should expressly impose an 
explicit ‘fiduciary-like’ duty on financial advisers requiring them to give priority to their clients’ interests 
 
180 Fiduciary Duties UK 2013 (n 106) 171 citing Peter Watt (ed), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency 
(Sweet & Maxwell, 19th ed, 2010) [6–043]. 
181 Leeming, (n 41) 108. 
182 Millhouse, (n 1). 
183 Paul Finn, ‘Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries’, (2010) 38 FLR 342, 350 citing G Thomas, ‘The duty 
of Trustees to Act in the “Best Interest’ of their beneficiaries’ (2008) 2 Journal of Equity 177. 
184 Tuch, (n 155) 516. 
185 Heydon (n 2). 
186 Finn, (n 183). 
187 Finn, (n 183) 335. 
188 Tuch, (n 155) 516. 
189 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, 
Inquiry into Financial Services and Products in Australia, 2009 (‘Ripoll’). 
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ahead of their own’.190 The Commonwealth responded with the FoFA191reforms which did not include a 
statutory fiduciary duty, only a statutory best interest duty.192  
 
Clients are in a lesser legal position than before those reforms. FoFA subsumes general law fiduciary duty 
behind compliance with statutory process, safe harbour defence for compliance with that process,193 has 
differing liability for employees of financial planning firms and their authorised representatives and does 
not extend procedural protections to non-retail investors (who may only have retail level skills). Political 
influence is the cause: it is a sop, without remedy, removing general law protection of undivided loyalty 
of financial and corporate advisers to their retail clients. It further entrenches the doctrine of prioritisation 
over prohibition, continued by FASEA. It ignores the essential contribution of financial products and 
services provision to daily life. It is industry centric, not consumer centric,  
 
Applying the Canadian SRO/CRM Model in Australia 
If the objective of further Australian reform is to transform its financial planning and wealth management 
sectors into a respected profession, this will require reform of how regulation is implemented and reform 
of Australia’s restrictive fiduciary tradition. The distinctive Canadian regulatory system based on fiduciary 
duty and responsive regulation has much to offer Australia in this quest for reform of its financial advisory 
sector. It evolves the regulation of financial services advice into an ex ante posture delivered and policed 
by the financial planning industry organisations themselves. They would have regulatory responsibility 
supervised, audited and enforced by ASIC.  
They will also have financial literacy objectives. They will replace government agencies including ASIC 
in financial literacy education. These are mostly tactical and antiseptic, ignore behavioural economics 
research which requires active interventions in ‘teachable moments’194 alongside the provision of proper, 
useful and comprehensible disclosure during active investing. One objective is to generate deeper client 
relationships disciplined by fiduciary responsibility and improved client financial literacy. Proximity to the 
client engenders knowledge transfer and the re-establishment of trust. The fiduciary obligation is 
 
190 Australian Securities and Investments Commission, Submission to the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Financial 
Services and Products in Australia (August 2009) tab 2, 12. 
191 Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012 (Cth); Corporations Amendment 
(Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth). 
192 Hanrahan notes that the [Ripoll] recommendations were ‘initially adopted in April 2010, but in 
November 2011, the then responsible Minister moved away from categorising the duty as fiduciary, 
describing it as a “statutory best interest duty”’: Pamela F Hanrahan, ‘The relationship between 
equitable and statutory ‘best interest’ obligations in financial services law’ 7(1) Journal of Equity 
(2013) V. The FSC argued for this outcome. The FPA supported further amendment of Corporations 
Act s 961B(2)(g) to the best interest duty in December 2013 which allowed for ‘scaled advice’. See 
also Cooper, above n 40, Pt One App K 157. Political influence was raised in respect of FoFA and 
APRA in the qualitative research. See also Ben Butler, ‘Can a change of guard fix ASIC’s image?’, 
The Weekend Australian Business (Sydney), 22–23 March 2018, 29. 
193 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 961B(2). 
194 S Schwartz, ‘The Canadian Task Force on Financial Literacy: Consulting without listening’ (2011) 
51 Canadian Business Law Journal 338, 352. See also Millhouse (n 205) [6.208]. 
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underpinned by personal liability of directors and senior management extending to the approval of financial 
products provision to clients. Proximity renders the need for safe harbour defence obsolete. 
The Australian equivalent of the CRM will need to account for the rapid march of technology. ASIC asserts 
a technology neutral regulatory environment.195 Some scholars assert that ‘financial consumers are more 
willing to trust the digital platform than a face-to-face adviser,196 noting that ‘willingness … to trust the 
robo-adviser comes close to Finns’ ‘“fiduciary expectations” thesis’.197 
The meaning of ‘best interest’ can be informed by adopting The Global Uniform Fiduciary Standard. 
Some jurisdictional codes provide guidance. In Canada, best interest standards automatically include 
fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties from all sources of law in its CRM enforced through SROs. This 
eliminates present ambiguity in Australian best interest interpretations. Duties would extend to the SRO, 
its directors, officers, professional advisers, and their financial planners.198 As in Canada, Australia 
would have a principles-based interpretation of the nature and scope of fiduciary obligations in financial 
advice which meet implicit community assumptions. It results in a uniform fiduciary standard previously 
proposed in the US.199 SRO models require implementation support of fiduciary law and effective 
enforcement by the regulator. 
The necessary national infrastructure presently exists in Australia. The Australian SRO model would 
apply inter alia to the Financial Services Council (FSC), Association of Independently Owned Financial 
Planners (AIOFP), Financial Planning Association (FPA), Association of Financial Advisers (AFA), and 
the Independent Financial Advisers Association of Australia (IFAA). These organisations will require 
reform of their objectives, governance, culture, and operations to implement the model. They would 
become regulators generating ‘significant compliance and cooperation’,200 not industry lobbyists, 
themselves attempting to apply the FASEA Code of Ethics.  
Two strategic benefits arise: these are the removal from ASIC of the impossible burden of policing ex 
post, every financial advice transaction, and transitioning the financial planning sector into a self-
regulated ex ante supervised profession with fiduciary status. Enforcement of Australian SROs would be 
ASIC’s role, similar to Canadian Securities Administrators.  
 
195 Providing digital financial advice to retail clients (ASIC Regulatory Guide 255, August 2016) 
[RG255.6]. 
196 Simone Degeling and Jessica Hudson, ‘Financial Robots as Instruments of Fiduciary Loyalty’ 
(2018) 40 Sydney Law Review 63, 78. 
197 Ibid citing Paul Finn, ‘Fiduciary Reflections’ (2014) 88(2) Australian Law Journal 127, 139. 
198 Directly employed and Authorised Representatives 
199 P Demina, ‘Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: A Behavioural Economics Analysis of 
Competing Suggestions for Reform’ (2014) 113 Michigan Law Review 429, 439 citing M S Barr et al, 
‘The Case for Behaviourally Informed Regulation’ (2009) New Perspectives on Regulation 25. 
200 Laura Paglia, Standard of Conduct for Advisors and Dealers: Exploring the Appropriateness of 
Introducing Statutory Best Interest Duty when Advice is provided to Retail Clients, (Canadian 
Securities Administrators Consultation Paper 33-403, 2013) 27.  
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These reforms would solve the systemic problems in the financial advice sector in Australia which 
incremental Australian statutory reforms to date, including FoFA201 do not. Implementation must be 
statutorily supported: eliminate non-reliance clauses in advisory contracts which remove fiduciary 
liability; extend client fiduciary obligations to the directors and senior management (which cannot be 
delegated) of financial advisory and wealth management firms; and apply retail consumer protection law 
to the sale of all financial products and services. As in Canada, remove statutory safe harbour defence in 
retail financial advice. 
Elevation of financial planning to professional status will require the licencing of financial planners 
personally based on personal educational and performance competencies, consistent with a revised 
FASEA ‘Relevant Providers’ examination. Personal licensing facilitates transferability of skills sets and 
places responsibility directly with the individual fiduciary.  
9. Market conduct regulation for the 21st century  
 
Regulatory and supervisory agencies are an essential component of the national architecture. They too, 
must share the reform objective. Indeed, it is in their interest to do so: reform is the only means by which 
they can ameliorate and eliminate the excoriating criticisms they have faced. 
ASIC is mandated as an ex-post market conduct regulator with broadening responsibilities.  
[E]x post strategies are often dysfunctional in the light of behavioural economics … [which] reveal that the 
traditionally highly legislated monitoring and control strategies need to be evaluated in a different light … 
to avoid mindless decision making…202 
ASIC is a prisoner of its ASIC Act and the Corporations Act. It has not met its stakeholder expectations.203 
It should lead, not follow, by setting out a proposed reform agenda having considered the research available 
to it. A redefined charter requires amendment of the ASIC Act.204 A redefined mandate leads directly to 
analysis of ASIC’s human and financial resources required for implementation. As with the BaFin, a 
culture of natural politeness (in administrative compliance), powers being exercised in commercially 
relevant timescales, and stakeholder respect (including in enforcement) is a component of the spirit of the 
law. As in the German governance system,205 stakeholder representation should be balanced with 
management competencies. Its mandate and its reactive, issue-based posture is ‘not fully replicated by any 
other conduct regulator globally’.206  
 
201 Corporations Amendment (Future of Financial Advice) Act 2012 (Cth);  Corporations Amendment 
(Further Future of Financial Advice Measures) Act 2012 (Cth). 
202 Hoeppner and Kirchner, (n 39) 251. 
203 K Chester, M Gray and D Galbally, Fit for the future: A capability review of the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission ―A Report to the Government, Report, December 2015 cited 
in David Millhouse, Corporate Governance in Non-Bank Financial Entities (LexisNexisButterworths, 
2019) [2.219]–[2.222]. 
204 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2). 
205 Millhouse (n 125) [7.76]–[7.82]. 
206 Chester, Gray and Galbally, (n 203) 34. 
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Insights from comparative jurisdictions 
Balancing industry development with compliance cultures requires pragmatism. This pragmatism should 
extend to clarity, certainty, and consistency in public policy, law, and regulation both prescriptive and 
principles based. Singapore’s objective is to reduce ‘productivity sapping ambiguities’.207 Pragmatism, 
within a unified system of law, is an objective of German financial regulation. A combination of principles-
based regulation observing the spirit as well as the letter of the law founded on natural politeness, 
consultation, civil law duty of care and fiduciary doctrines, and proximity to supervised entities gives 
predictability to stakeholders. Canada, similarly, has embarked on a regulatory journey cognisant of 
behavioural economics research and given legislative form as Responsive Regulation with implementation 
through its SROs. Australia’s box-ticking compliance culture could be made obsolete by emulation of these 
insights. 
 
Conversely, the UK as in Australia, community anger at misplaced expectations generates public demand 
for revenge for subversion of economic interests behind statutory compliance. Public demand results in 
political pressure for prescriptive supervision by the same regulators that have been part of the problem. 
There is some recognition in the UK that regulators cannot police every commercial transaction or police 
corporate culture. That is not recognised in Australia where ASIC is expected to do both at ever increasing 
cost, an impossible burden. That compliance with process has not led to expected investor outcomes will 
be a cultural challenge for it and proponents of statutory accretion. 
Ex Ante or Ex Post Regulation?  
The objective is to eliminate inexhaustible demands for market conduct services from the central 
regulator.208 Ipso facto, ASIC regulation becomes ex ante and supervisory rather than ex post and reactive. 
Behavioural economics scholarly research supports this change in posture, regarding ex post strategies as 
‘behaviourally dysfunctional … [requiring a] counterintuitive shift of rule-making competencies: from 
public to private ordering.’209 In effect, Responsive Regulation. Discipline in implementation will be strict: 
underpinned by fiduciary obligation in the investment chain enforced by an effective properly mandated 
ASIC.  
This should reduce the ex post unintended consequences of regulatory action which can easily result in 
significant and detrimental impacts, loss of investor confidence (present and prospective), and compromise 
of underlying assets values.210  
 
207 Andrew Campbell, ‘Insolvent Banks and the Financial Sector Safety net – Lessons from the 
Northern Rock Crisis’ (2008) 20 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 316, 337. 
208 D Kingsford Smith, (n 101) 702. 
209 Hoeppner and Kirchner, (n 39). 
210 Australian Government The Treasury, Review of the Trio Capital Fraud and Assessment of the 
Regulatory Framework (Report, 2013) 14. 
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Educational Standards, Competencies, and Culture in Regulatory Agencies 
Whilst ’the role of a publicly funded regulator is to deter unlawful behaviour … it [ASIC] is tasked to 
regulate for the benefit of society as a whole’.211 This necessarily means lifting standards of behaviour and 
competence of market participants.212 Empirical analysis suggests this objective has not been reached. 
Effective regulators must have a stakeholder and societal teaching role including in the training of directors 
and trustees ― it is a component of supervision, lifts standards and competencies of lay people appointed 
to boards. ASIC staff need skills sets to take personal responsibility for timely and useful relationships 
with client stakeholders who now provide ASIC’s funding. ASIC needs to build its own CRM. 
Surveillance, compliance and enforcement are important but not the only tools in market integrity. Haynes’ 
‘Why not litigate?’ hypothesis may have unforeseen consequences ― these presently include increases in 
D&O insurance costs and director flight. A culture of retribution is now embedded relating to director and 
trustee disqualifications and enforcement actions. It is punitive and serves to diminish entrepreneurial 
endeavour. The author’s qualitative research213 reports board paralysis. Cases of corporate failure often result 
in public examinations of the directors who can be held up to ridicule, contempt, even when there is no breach 
of duty.214 A doctrinal approach should be rehabilitative.  
 
10. Corporate governance reform ― related party transactions and conflicts of interest 
 
Corporate Governance is the implementive cousin of the law ― including its spirit and its intent. Australian 
governance law is extremely complex.215 Empirical analysis identifies systemic deficiencies in the regulation 
of related party transactions and conflicts of interest.216 International regulatory principles designed to 
improve corporate regulation and behaviour,217 
 
211 Michelle Welsh and Vince Morabito, ‘Public v Private Enforcement of securities laws: An 
Australian empirical study’ (2014) 14(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39, 46, 78. 
212 Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1(2). 
213 Millhouse, (n 6) app 1. 
214 See, eg, Kelaher (n 74). 
215 See, eg, Drummond AJA in Westpac Banking Corporation v The Bell Group Ltd (in liq) (No3) [2012] 
WASCA 157 [2051]: ‘The impacts of corporate decision-making on a wider range of interests than shareholders 
are now being given more recognition. The need to ensure protection of those interests also I think serves to 
explain why modern company courts have become more interventionist, in reviewing the activities of directors 
than was traditionally the case’; See also, Commonwealth, HIH Royal Commission, The Failure of HIH 
Insurance Final Report (April 2003) (Commissioner Owen) quoted in R A St John, CAMAC, Corporate Duties 
below board level (Report, April 2006) 47: '[t]he uncertain state of the law in this area has been a source of 
difficulty in my assessment of those cases where there might have been a breach of the law ... '. As Kirby J 
acknowledged in Rich v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2004] HCA 42 [116]-[117], 'Such 
were the demonstrated abuses and errors in the management of Australian corporations in the 1980's that 
widespread demands were made for an end to complacency and for an attack on "bad corporate governance" 
being systemic "serious danger to the economy of the nation inherent in the multiple corporate collapses of the 
1980's, repeated in equally spectacular form in more recent years"'. See also, Justice Michael Kirby, 'The 
company director: past, present, and future' (Speech delivered at the Australian Institute of Company Directors, 
Tasmanian Division, Hobart, 1998). See generally Du Plessis, 'Reverberations after the HIH and other recent 
corporate collapses: the role of ASIC', (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 225. 
216 Millhouse, (n 1). 
217 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Principles of Corporate Governance 
(1999); See also Jillian Segal, ‘Corporate Governance: substance over form’ (2002) 25 University of 
New South Wales Law Journal 320. 
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emphasise managerial and directorial responsibilities and community expectations of a more proactive regulation of 
corporations, aimed at the steady maintenance of standards and integrity and competence in corporate governance. 
They reflect the view that participation in corporate governance is a privilege enjoyed by individuals subject to 
compliance with conditions. It is not a private right to be defended …218 
It is not only directors and trustees who are frustrated by complexities in the law.219  
 
Especially in an Act as large and cumbersome as that under consideration (with its history of patchwork accretions), 
it is impossible to be confident. …220 The construction of the Act now adopted needlessly restricts the Commission 
[ASIC] and the court in trying the claim. …221 Doing so seriously impedes the Act’s important purposes for corporate 
governance in this country.222  
 
There is considerable disharmony in Australia surrounding governance, 
 
free of the type of conflicts that may cause them (either intentionally or unintentionally) [to] serve the interests of 
the [employer and employee] sponsors, a related party or a subset of members, rather than the fund’s entire 
membership.223 
 
This conflict is politicised, legislative intervention highly contested, preventing rational reform. Vested interest, 
resistance to change, based on spurious argument or misunderstanding clouds serious reform within the swirling 
mists of Lilliputian conflicts. This arises from the different roles of representative stakeholders and board level 
competencies required to properly supervise management in meeting statutory and beneficiary objectives, ‘It is 
more important for directors to be independent, skilled, and accountable than representative’.224 Empirical 
research supports this view: ‘[t]rustees lack experience, training or suitable knowledge, creating the potential for 
not fully understanding advice that they receive from outside experts.’225  
 
Other jurisdictions have governance models which do give effect to the interests of all stakeholders. These have 
long been a feature of the German corporate governance environment226 which allocates authority to ‘alleviate 
conflicts of interest’.227 Adopting this model in the context of Australian superannuation entities, and others 
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controlled by representatives of registered organisations may provide a better model of governance of those 
entities and a solution to present policy conflicts. The ‘advantage of the German system is the clear division of 
function’.228 This separation of form and function echoes US governance reform promoted by the American Law 
Institute (ALI).229 The supervisory board is the German equivalent of ALI preference for ‘a majority of 
independent directors … free from any significant relationship with the corporation’s senior executives’.230  
Applying the German Corporate Governance Model to Australia 
How is reform to be implemented in Australia? What is the best mechanism to unlock economic benefits from 
governance reform in a contested political environment?  
The two-tier board system achieves by governance design what Australia seeks to achieve by statute. It is 
consistent with contested governance reform of Australian superannuation entities.231 The importance of form 
matching function increases as Australian entities invest internationally and for those which seek international 
investment. German style corporate governance is designed not only for ‘the maximisation of shareholder value, 
but ensuring stability and growth’.232  
Emulation of a two-tiered corporate governance structure (Supervisory Board and Management Board) would 
reform Australian NBFE corporate governance in superannuation and MIS environments. Stakeholders would 
appoint the supervisory board which then appoints and terminates a non-conflicted professionally competent 
management board. The voluntary Code of Trustee Governance for superannuation entities should be reviewed, 
become binding, and applied widely, following the EU comply-or-explain paradigm and benchmarked  inter alia 
against the GCGC. 
German statutory provisions are extensively supported by soft law designed to promote ‘a culture of open 
discussion in managerial and supervisory bodies’.233 This includes the extra-judicial GCGC,234 the OECD Ad-
Hoc Task Force on Corporate Governance, and institutional activism.235 The corporate governance code 
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‘strengthened the strategic role of the supervisory board’,236 now given statutory force,237 and updated annually. 
Since 2012, companies have to explain their reasons for noncompliance.238 
‘Since 2002, [German] company law requires both boards of listed German corporations to declare their 
conformity to the German Corporate Governance Code’.239 Directors of listed and unlisted companies may be 
liable for not meeting comply-or-explain provisions of the GCGC or merely for not acting in accordance with a 
specific governance rule.240 Modern German legal practice places responsibility for management supervision with 
the individual directors of the supervisory board and provides them with ‘sufficient power to focus the managers’ 
minds in the right direction’.241 ‘Promoting entrepreneurship is high on the agenda … and reflected in a number 
of company law [reform] initiatives’.242 Whilst partly a response to corporate mobility, treaty shopping or 
‘regulatory arbitrage’ around the EU, it is also a recognition that ‘regulatory burdens generally have a negative 
effect on entrepreneurship.’243 
 
Empirical Outcomes  
 
Performance disclosure is publicly contested in Australia. Ultimately, the efficacy of governance in the Australian 
context will be a test of long-term empirical performance. Empirical research on the German two-tier board system 
dates from 1998.244 Empirical analysis demonstrates that: 
 
The degree of compliance with the Code is consistently value-relevant information for the capital market … Firms with a 
higher compliance are priced at an average premium … consistent with the hypothesis that there are capital market pressures 
(or at least incentives), suggesting a broad adoption of the Code...245 
 
 
236 K J Hopt and P C Leyens, ‘Board models in Europe ― Recent development of Internal Governance 
Structures in Germany, the UK, France, and Italy’ (2004) 2 European Company and Financial Law 
Journal 135. 
237 Stock Corporation Act (Germany) 1965 (‘AktG’) § 161. 
238 Thomas Kaspereit, Kerstin Lopatta, and Dennis Onnen, ‘Shareholder Value Implications of 
Compliance with the German Corporate Governance Code’ (2015) in Managerial and Decision 
Economics, wileyonlinelibrary.com DOI:10.1002/mde.2750. 
239 Igor Goncharov, Joerg Richard Werner and Jochen Zimmerman, ‘Does Compliance with the 
German Corporate Governance Code have an Impact on Stock Valuation? An empirical analysis’ 
(2006) 14(5) Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society 432. 
240 M Kort, ‘Standardisation of Company Law in Germany, other EU Member States and Turkey by 
Corporate Governance Rules’ (2008) 5 European Company and Financial Law Review 379, 417–418. 
241 Andrew Ross and Kenny Crossan, ‘A review of the influence of corporate governance on the 
banking crises in the UK and Germany’ (2012) 12(2) Corporate Governance: The international 
journal of business in society 215, 223. 
242 Mette Neville and Karsten Engsig Sorensen, ‘Promoting Entrepreneurship ― The New Company 
Law Agenda’ (2014) 15 European Business Organisation Law Review 545. 
243 Ibid 554. 
244 John H Farrar, ‘In pursuit of an appropriate theoretical perspective and methodology for 
comparative corporate governance’ (2001) 13 Australian Journal of Corporate Law 1. 
245 Goncharov, Werner and Zimmerman, (n 239) 442. 
34 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis Group in Law and Financial 
Markets Review on 11/06/2020, available online: https://doi.org/10.1080/17521440.2020.1759218 
The average share price premium of €3.23 on a median of €29.17 and mean of €35.05 is significant. This analysis 
of 2 379 German companies GCGC compliance associated with their higher market valuation.246 Unitary board 
models have not shown similar results.247  
 
Later research (sample size 292 UK and German insurers and reinsurers) confirms these findings:248 
a higher level of compliance significantly increases shareholder value ... [we] conclude that the GCGC rules are 
meaningful to the market and that executives ought to pursue full compliance with the recommendations of the 
Code.249 
These studies imply foregone value to Australian securities holders and beneficiaries as a result of less optimal 
corporate governance practices. 
 
11. Conclusions 
The four reform themes must be sequenced, taking ‘significant time for construction, debate, refinement and 
implementation’.250 Strategic reform requires acceptance and implementation by the various stakeholder groups. 
The effectiveness and stability generated by prudential supervision needs to be embedded as a governance value 
system ― a culture ― within the non-prudentially regulated sector. Successful implementation aligns interest of 
provider and consumer: it also changes the role of the regulators ― they become educators, supervisors. A healthy 
culture results in enforcement becoming a last resort. 
Reform should be financial consumer centric, not supplier or regulator centric. Financially independent retirement 
for Australians is a pipe-dream if that focus is compromised. Consumer empowerment through improved financial 
literacy and destruction of power imbalances in the investment chain requires oversight outside of existing 
supervisory structures. ‘An informed, expertly staffed and independent institution evaluating financial regulations 
and regulatory actions from the public’s point of view’.251 This will allow different views to be heard, not 
subsumed by existing vested and politicised interests who will regroup and dilute proposed reforms that affect 
those interests.252  
Resolution also includes emulation of models and standards from other jurisdictions which themselves have dealt 
with similar systemic failures. There are examples where professional and industry associations are quasi-
regulators working from the bottom up, educative and consultative, thereby reducing inexhaustible demands for 
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market conduct services from the central regulator, making for more effective ‘Responsive Regulation’,253 
presently given lip-service rather than practical implementation. The basis of necessary infrastructure exists in 
Australia today.  
Scholarly research has demonstrated the difference between compliance based cultures and values based cultures 
and how ‘assumptions of rationality in economic theory are contradicted by experimental evidence’.254 This 
important behavioural economics research has global multi-jurisdictional implications255 but receives only limited 
scholarly attention in Australia. It supports change in posture, regarding ex post regulatory strategies as 
‘behaviourally dysfunctional’ requiring a ‘counterintuitive shift of rule-making competencies: from public to 
private ordering.’256 ‘[I]t is doubtful whether [ex post] monitoring can be done cost effectively’.257 Consequential 
superior stakeholder outcomes are also supported by empirical analysis.258 
Evolution to an ex ante Responsive Regulation model requires discipline in those that implement it. There is a 
tendency to confuse principles based regulation, including reliance on fiduciary obligations, with light touch 
regulation, a misnomer ― ‘a principles-based approach does not work with individuals who have no principles’,259 
― nor indeed does statute with those inclined to creative compliance. The extension of fiduciary responsibility to 
prospective malfeasors, properly enforced is certainly not light touch.  
The Damoclean Sword over improper conduct is to be provided by fiduciary obligation in the investment chain 
enforced by effective regulators seeking judicial support:   
[F]iduciary duties are difficult to define and inherently flexible. We think that is one of their essential characteristics: 
they form the background to other more definite rules, allowing the courts to intervene where the interests of justice 
require it260 
‘[T]he term “fiduciary duty” means different things to lawyers and non-lawyers. Even lawyers use the term in 
different ways.’261 Therefore, [t]here needs to be clarity about fiduciary responsibility, backed by a tough 
regulatory regime that says: if you misbehave, you are out ― and for good.262 
Why is Australia reluctant to embrace statutory fiduciary obligation in the investment chain? Why, in Australia, 
are the economic interests of investors and beneficiaries subsumed by processes of statutory compliance? Why 
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do Hayne’s systemic recommendations, central to such reforms, remain in limbo, except by an unfunded ALRC? 
From a community expectations perspective, ‘[f]eelings of exploitation feed naturally into fiduciary law’s rhetoric 
of betrayal.’263  
Community expectations of fiduciary obligation are based on ‘the reasonable expectations of one person that 
another would act in his [practical] interests … The Canadian model is ’admirably capacious’.264 A beneficiary 
may establish a fiduciary relationship unilaterally’, provided there is a reasonable basis,265 surely a Damoclean 
Sword.  
In Germany, pure liability fiduciary-like civil law duties of care are now codified in EU statutes. If Australian 
directors and advisers were subject to German duty of care civil law untreue and culpa in contrahendo fiduciary-
like doctrines (in their proscriptive and prescriptive formulations), supreme rather than subordinate, they would 
be less likely to hide behind statutory and contractual box-ticking.  
This is where Australian law266 and law of comparable jurisdictions may begin to converge ― reflecting 
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